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The rights to the vote and to an abortion do not usually appear
simultaneously on the historical stage. But in 1994, three months
before the world's last racist regime collapsed, the African
National Congress announced it favoured abortion on demand in
early pregnancy. Late entry to the world of democracy seemingly
had some advantages: neck and neck arrival of the most basic and
the most advanced rights.
Numerous ANC intellectuals and supporters had for years been
calling for 'a woman's democratic right: the right to control her
own body.'1 This was allegedly 'the most basic human right',
central to attaining equality with men.2 Their borrowings from
western feminism were unmistakeable. Academic voices had long
been insisting that democracy had never existed for women, and
that male supremacy was closely related to controls over female
fertility and sexuality. More pertinently, ordinary women had
defined for themselves a crucial arena where they wanted to take
charge of their lives. In struggles to legalize abortion in
America, many had identified unwanted pregnancies as their single
most important problem. In Britain, campaigns to defend the right
to legal terminations could mobilize more women than any other
demand. Understandably, many western feminists have posited
access to free, legal, safe abortion as central to winning female
self-determination and attaining greater democracy. Denying such
a right, argued Anne Phillips, is to treat women 'as if their
bodies belonged to someone else. Democracy is not supposed to
coexist with slavery, and no society can present itself as fully
democratic if it compels women into unwanted pregnancy'.3
But in South Africa, extending the principle's of political
democracy to the domain of reproduction hardly has mass appeal.
'You call that democratic?' asked a working class 'coloured'
father of twelve incredulously, counterpoising his own belief
that woman's 'Right full Role on Earth' was childbirth, and
prophesying damnation for 'Learneth evil cloaks' who wanted to
murder babies.4 The ANC was itself riven with conflict. It
compromised by minimising awareness of this aspect of its
programme among voters, and presenting its policy shift as a
response to the prevalence of backstreet abortions. This, too,
has little popular appeal. 'Why was she pregnant in the first
place?', exclaimed an extremely hostile African nurse. 'When all
over the Family Planning is all over, on the video, on the media,
there is Family Planning all over?'4
The plaint is common among those with education and video
recorders. But it also skates effortlessly over the power
relations of both the present and the past. For most women, in
most countries, for almost all of recorded history, abortion has
been an absolutely central form of birth control. As horrified
Victorian officials in the Transkei reported in the mid-
nineteenth century, it was 'almost universally practised by all
classes of females in Kafir society' .' Sotho women, wrote a
shocked white gynaecologist in the late nineteenth century,
believed blood
collects in the woman for three months, it hardens, becomes
flesh, and then the child is formed in the centre. Up to the
third month it is not a child, it is only blood...a
native doctor is nowhere unless he possesses some powerful
medicine to bring back the blood.7
Such beliefs were typical in pre-industrial societies
worldwide. Indeed, to the distress oif countless male theologians,
the Bible was written by men characteristic of their time, and
contains not a word on either life at conception or abortion.
Nonetheless, male physicians and priests could step in where
Scripture feared to tread. During an upsurge of abortions among
American and European women in the nineteenth century, first
doctors, then the Pope, then Protestants, abandoned centuries of
Christian consensus: that the male foetus was alive only after
forty days, and the female, inferior as ever, after eighty. Both
the clerical and medical professions then struggled to convince
ordinary people that motherhood was female destiny, that abortion
at any time was murder. Unfortunately, winning hearts and minds
for an imperial cause took time in the colonies. While abortion
has now been widely internalized as homicide, older notions
linger on in South Africa to this day. A woman has the right to
bring back her blood; this is quite distinct from murder.
Debased folkloric remedies, however, became ever less
capable of inducing late periods. Yet there were nonetheless
class dimensions to replacing indigenous methods of birth control
with the newfangled products of multinational companies. The
poor, the rural, the uneducated, repeatedly spurned commodities
that typically assumed bourgeois lifestyles. Being black in South
Africa was also reason enough to find contraception problematic.
Since the 1960s, when the state began to finance 'prevention',
this was all too clearly the white man's idea to limit black
numbers. Resistance was embroidered with a host of beliefs,
including the notion that blacks received inferior products. Yet
white women also had reason to complain - and being female was
another good reason for^jaundiced responses to contraception.
Commodities developed primarily by men, for profit, did and do
produce in women's bodies a 'grisly collection of contraceptive-
induced disease'.'
For many women willing to gamble with their health, an
additional obstacle loomed. Male opposition to birth control was
strong - and intimately connected to desires to control female
fertility and sexuality. For many black men, the prime function
of women -was to produce babies; they policed contraception with
tactics ranging from confiscation of pills to assault. Moreover,
if intercourse could be separated from reproduction, what stopped
others from stealing their sexual prpperty? ' Dis die mans',
insisted a 'coloured' woman, explaining widespread hostility to
birth control; 'hulle wil hS die vrouens moet altyd suanger wees,
anders loop sy na ander mans.'1" As an African male 'family
planning' official dolefully noted, men were partly responsible
for women turning to abortion: a form of birth control needing
neither male knowledge nor co-operation."
So for reasons relating to history, class, race and gender,
women sought terminations despite the availability of
'prevention'. Yet abortions were relatively rare among Africans
in the 1940s. As in Nigeria, and unlike East African countries
with far lower levels of industrialization and urbanization, they
attained epidemic proportions only in the 1970s. By the 1980s,
according to one guesstimate, one in six pregnant women induced
her own miscarriage. In the early 1990s, there was perhaps one
backstreet abortion every two and a half minutes.12
What propelled this rush for catheters and coathangers?
Firstly, worldwide, incorporation into paid employment has been
one of the single most important factors forcing females to
restrict their fertility. African women began trickling into
industry and commerce from the 1950s; by the mid-1970s, after the
frenetic boom of the preceding decade, almost one in two was
economically active outside her home in non-bantustan areas.
Secondly, secondary schooling for African girls has grown
exponentially since the late 1950s. As in the rest of sub-Saharan
Africa - where education for women underpinned soaring abortion
rates - black women hurtled into spheres previously reserved
largely for males and for whites began seeking fertility
control.13 Thirdly, 'town girls' have been strongly associated
with abortion: this is perhaps particularly true of first-
generation urban dwellers. Once again, a dramatic transition was
sardined into three decades. Some time between 1960 and the mid-
1980s, due not least to forcible resettlement of millions on 13%
of the land, the largely rural African populace became
predominantly urbanized."
Finally, these vast upheavals impacted on women's intimate
lives. Neither 'family' nor 'planning' were appropriate terms for
a world dominated by massive disruption of older controls over
fertility and sexuality, abandonment of pregnant women by mobile
men, and the explosive growth of homes without fathers. In a
racist, sexist society, off-loading responsibility for children
onto women alone could impose intolerable financial strain. (In
1973, 62% of African female industrial workers - but only 13% of
African men - earned under RIO a week, due largely to
discriminatory wages based on gender, and to women being herded
into economic ghettoes.) Understandably, the typical woman
seeking an abortion throughout this period was probably African,
unmarried, urban - and poor.15
To be sure, many failed to fit this profile. If 'the
democratization of birth control' was one of the most significant
social developments worldwide in the twentieth century,
democratization of a special type occurred in South Africa."
Backstreet abortions were sought by the wealthy and the poor, by
'coloured' workers and Indian schoolgirls, by childless women and
mothers of nine, by urban whites and rural blacks, by females
ranging between thirteen and fifty years old, by wives, single
mothers, widows and unmarried women. They crossed geo-political
borders in their desperate searches; they ignored racial
boundaries as well. They shared one common feature, and one
alone: being female of reproductive age in a patriarchal
world.17
Significantly, support for legalizing abortion on socio-
economic grounds has consistently demonstrated rather more
specific patterns. To be crude: education, income, occupation,
proficiency in English and urbanization, not race or gender,
appear to have been the really significant variables. Moreover,
in a country where illiteracy and poverty have been far more
widespread than tertiary education and wealth, abortion on demand
has always attracted the support of only a small minority.
According to the most recent survey, it was favoured by 47% of
white women, 28% of black women, 20% of all men, 18% of rural
blacks, and a mere 15% of those who were illiterate.18
Nonetheless, abortion on demand has now been placed on the
agenda by those who have historically favoured it: an urbanized,
educated, English-speaking, upwardly mobile minority. A debate
intensifying for years has now exploded. It consists largely of
starkly contrasting claims. ('The will of God is against
abortion', 'abortion in our culture is not practised', 'giving
women the right to choose is the only democratic way'...)
Typically, these assertions are all presented as transhistorical,
transclass truths. They ignore, completely, the context in which
women have sought to terminate pregnancies. They are also infused
with the common sexist assumption that female reproduction has no
past, belongs to the timeless realm of nature.
Yet there is a history of passing interest to !-oth feminists
and democrats. Firstly, there is a story of how the law
currently under debate for repeal or reform came to be passed.
And that in itself is an account of deep-seated inequalities in
power and wealth, impacting profoundly on whose voices were
ultimately enshrined in legal clauses. Secondly, this is a tale
of discordant discourses, encoding v^ry particular class, racial,
gender, generational and professional interests - and passing
them off as universal truths. Thirdly, it is also an account of
an elite pro-choice minority, making tactical and ideological
decisions - and then both losing the battle and marginalizing
women who had terminated their pregnancies. Finally, it is a
history that points, insistently, to the similarities between
struggles over reproductive rights in South Africa and those
elsewhere. The issue was and is not abortion. This merely
provides a fulcrum for much broader conflicts. In America, for
example, the real bone of contention was feminism: 'virtually all
antiabortion sentiment arises from some kind of response to the
women's movement'." In apartheid South Africa, there was an
additional twist to this tale. White supremacy was also,
crucially, at stake. For black and white nationalists alike, the
issue was not simply whether women could decline to be mothers of
men. Above all, it was whether they could repudiate being mothers
of racially defined nations. Consequently, those who entered the
fray focusing narrowly on abortion got riddled with bullets.
Fundamental racial, class and gender interests were also involved
- and these continue to haunt the present.
ORIGINS OF A GREAT DEBATE
In the 1960s, a revolutionary drug allegedly changed millions of
lives and transformed social orders. Reality was more mundane for
many black South African women. The 99% effective pill, developed
in response to mushrooming metropolitan fears about population
explosions in the peripheries, pitted their bodies against
pharmaceutical firms. The battle was unequal and quickly
concluded. 'Why do so many women give up?', asked a white doctor
at a birth control clinic despairingly, noting how many then had
unwanted pregnancies. The answer was simple. 'Side-effects' was
the single most important reason, black females informed her.20
Physicians casually confirmed their plaints were more than
justified. They also noted that investing in products less
hazardous to female bodies was 'an embarrassment to firms who had
spent large sums popularizing their earlier preparations.'21 Yet
if profit and politics overrode female health, women with
unwanted pregnancies nonetheless had other options.
Abortion was licit only if performed to save a woman's life.
But the dogmas of seventeenth century male legal authorities
meant little. In 1959-64, there was an average of one death a
week from illegal abortion in Johannesburg. Assuming safety
standards in the backstreets of eGoli were similar to those in
Durban, this translated into about 200 induced miscarriages a
week, or some 10,000 a year in South Africa's industrial
heartland.22 The phenomenon was clearly more widespread and also
accelerating. A high rate of illegal terminations in the reserves
was reported. Conviction rates of (overwhelmingly African female)
abortionists doubled in just over a decade. Clinics were besieged
by ever more black pregnant women naively requesting help. By the
early 1970s, a bantustan doctor working among the Tswana was
confronted almost daily with illegal abortions. In Soweto alone,
guesstimated rates had soared to 500 a week.23
Yet although backstreet abortions were overwhelmingly
concentrated among Africans, the debate exploded among whites.
Admittedly, a shared female experience transcended colour: a
desire for greater control over reproduction, rooted in
transformations with profound class and racial modulations. For
one thing, 'around 1970 white South Africans overtook
Californians as the single most affluent group in the world' .24
As always, prosperity was reflected in plunging birth rates. For
another, ever more white women (including older housewives who
hoped their childbearing days were over) were gatecrashing into
paid employment. In addition, the very availability of the pill
made unwanted pregnancies increasingly unthinkable. Contraception
and abortion rates frequently rise simultaneously, precisely
because those who seek terminations have typically tried to
practise some form of birth control.25
As horrified conservatives viewed it, 'permissiveness' had
also crossed the Atlantic and infected the white body politic.
Illegitimacy and divorce rates were rising; eroticism was being
harnessed to marketing goods; sex was hitting the headlines;
contraception was becoming a fashionable topic of discussion. Not
only were discursive taboos surrounding fertility and sexuality
being broken: the metropoles were also exporting their subversive
ideas about abortion. In the early 1960s, these were linked to
'thalidomide babies': a sedative prescribed to pregnant women was
producing a terrifying wave of armless, legless children. Then
worldviews in the periphery were even more fundamentally
challenged. In one of history's magnificent ironies, just as many
South Africans were at last internalizing that abortion was
murder, the theologians and doctors who had exported this notion
were changing their minds."
Whether abortion is homicide or a woman's right is a matter
of socially constructed opinion. As in the past, the ideas of a
British elite were veering in response to seismic shifts in
social structures and struggles. Once again, their new views
reverberated among ordinary parishioners and patients. After all,
if abortion is seen as identical to infanticide, there are few
grounds for supporting it in industrialized societies. If it is
not, then space opens up for debate as to when it is permissible.
The sea change in the position of doctors and establishment
churches - in 1965 the Church of England ruled it was justifiable
to terminate a pregnancy on a woman's request - was a crucial
precondition for legalizing abortion in Britain in 1967."
Where Britain, Japan and much of the socialist world had
led, could South Africa be far behind?; It could. Churches were
still debating whether contraception was sinful; Afrikaner
nationalists were imploring white women to have more babies. Pro-
natalism, anti-communism and virulent xenophobia continued to
obsess many whites - but numerous professionals nonetheless found
lagging behind their metropolitan counterparts galling. This was
especially true of doctors. As in Britain, self-interest drove
them into the fray: they wanted to legalize their illegal
'therapeutic' abortions.28
Their therapy was but a drop in the ocean of demand. In
exceptional circumstances, they granted cures to abnormal women.
Otherwise, the profession was permeated with contempt for a
simple operation associated with 'quacks', and violating ideas
about appropriate feminine behaviour. In one hospital in 1967,
doctors performed two such abortions. 99% of the pregnancies
terminated within its precincts presented as septic or incomplete
miscarriages illegally or spontaneously induced elsewhere.2'
Nonetheless, medical men were protected from prosecution for
their therapy by no more than a flimsy'< gentlemen's agreement with
officialdom. Unfortunately, at a time when the knout of apartheid
law was being more vigorously brandished, the overseers of racist
courts had increasingly less sympathy for medical discretion.
Some '10,000 European children (foetuses) had been killed' by one
convicted doctor-abortionist, complained an Attorney General
bitterly.30 Consequently, ever more physicians perceived the
problem as oppression of the medical profession. Unlike their
British counterparts, their freedom of action was being limited
by an impossibly narrow law.31
Thus from the mid-1960s, a white vanguard dominated by self-
interested doctors and elite English-speaking women dragged
others into a debate centred on separating the deservedly from
the undeservedly pregnant. In drawing the boundary line,
organizations and individuals infused their own very particular
concerns. The Afrikaanse Calvinisciese Beueging, for example,
added women who had taken LSD to their list of those who might be
awarded abortions. But drugs that might result in 'thalidomide
babies' worried most far less than sex that created black
offspring. Many were outraged that 'a White woman raped by a non-
White could not have the resulting pregnancy - and the birth of a
Coloured child - legally terminated in South Africa.'"
State apparatuses largely tried to hold the line at that
deemed acceptable in the seventeenth century. But in 1971-2, a
rearguard action became a rout. Numerous doctors were prosecuted
for performing abortions bearing no relation to saving maternal
lives. The trials of those who had terminated pregnancies on
demand were carefully stage-managed: their black and married
clients were rendered invisible. But while many whites were
shocked by the apparent concentration of abortions among
unmarried members of the dominant race, most also swung leftwards
rather than rightwards. The law did indeed seem antediluvian, if
a gynaecologist could be hauled into court for terminating the
pregnancy of a white 'sub-normal fifteen year old incestuously
[raped] by a moronic brother' ." Consequently, the debate among
elites spilled over into a far broader arena. The antiquated and
unenforceable law was placed in the dock; pressures from below
became uncontainable; reform from above was placed on the agenda
in 1972-3.
Although a swollen state was obliged to embrace the shameful
domain of abortion, it also tried to minimize the impact of
liberalizing the law. Running alongside easier access to
terminations for whites - and proposed by the same
Parliamentarian - was intensified commitment to contraceptives
and anti-natalism for blacks. Moreover, the drafters of the 1973
Abortion and Sterilization Bill, itself saturated with the
assumption that 'woman' meant 'white woman', had absolutely no
intention of following the United States down the road to
abortion on request. The conditions for legal access were
strictly defined: pregnancy in circumstances relating to rape,
incest, imbecility, sex under the age of consent (sixteen), or
serious endangerment of female or foetal health."
In a request given minimal publicity, the broader populace,
so long the tail waving the dog, was then invited to comment. In
time-honoured ruling class fashion, the opinions of Africans were
not desired. Nor was the white minority expected to think too
deeply or democratically. The organizations solicited from above
for their opinions were peremptorily asked to respond within less
than six weeks - which often made it impossible to consult
members at all. Nonetheless, an authoritarian state profoundly
committed to undemocratic practices was unable to suppress
radically divergent views.
PRO-CHOICE POLITICS: CLASS AMD RACE
Between 1971, when the trickle of interest in abortion became a
flood, and 1975, when the final Act was passed, pro-choice
politics was completely dominated by a tiny segment of the white
middle classes. Ardent supporters of abortion on demand in the
first trimester (or rather, abortion on request to doctors, as
most deferentially preferred to express it, avoiding too close an
identification with American feminists), tended be wealthier,
better-educated, English-speaking women and men. Crucially, they
derived predominantly from the professions (doctors, academics,
ministers, lawyers, politicians, psychiatrists, journalists); a
handful were self-employed or white collar workers. Activists
undoubtedly made inroads into other social groups: the ten
thousand Natalians who signed petitions for abortion on request
were allegedly drawn 'from all walks of life. Matron, saleslady,
farmer, fitter, car technician, health educator, nutrition
educator, teacher, mother of five children, housewife, student -
they were all there.'35 Perhaps so - but this is nonetheless a
list strongly focused on the salariat, and walks of life
excluding those of the working class seem somewhat limited.
Significantly, too, the only political grouping where pro-choice
arguments resonated was the Progressive Party, long associated
with upper middle class, English-speaking urbanites.
Class knows no racial boundaries, despite the efforts of
South African rulers to disprove this theorem. Blacks supporting
abortion on request included African, Muslim and Asian doctors
and academics, a female trader-cum-Zulu politician, Gatsha
Buthelezi, and the nominated elite incorporated into the South
African Indian Council.36 Like Buthelezi, however, they often
hovered uneasily between their personal opinions and allegiance
to the state or a conservative constituency; their support but
faintly coloured the white face of pro-choice politics. Of far
greater significance in the whistle-stop petition campaign -
which omitted rural Africans completely - were some 1,500 black
nurses, clerks and workers in Durban. The proportion of labourers
in the 'voteless crowds...standing five deep around the tables'
is unclear, but workers able to read an English placard and sign
their names were certainly exceptions to the rule.37
Thus the class and racial underpinnings of pro-choice
politics were fairly starkly etched; they in turn helped sustain
a discourse with elitist and racist overtones. For many whites,
the alleged population explosion in the underdeveloped world was
only a township away. By one calculation, South Africa's
demographic growth rate in 1973 was some 28% higher than
Nigeria's, 40% greater than India's, and 220% higher than that of
the United States. More pertinently, jthe boom was ending;
economic growth rates were sliding downwards to the point where
they were uncomfortably close to rates of increase in
population.38 The 'determining factor in history', an old-
fashioned philosopher once alleged, is the production of both
material necessities and children.3' Nonetheless, it took both
time and struggle, in the form of economic crisis and successive
black uprisings, for these factors to nudge numerous white
businessmen and bureaucrats into the legalized abortion camp.
White pro-choice activists were far quicker off the mark.
Presenting abortion as a form of population control of the black
under classes was simultaneously a way of decontaminating it.
Consequently, the national question encouraged a much
swifter convergence between pro-choicers and population
controllers than occurred in America. Indeed, the alliance began
at birth for the Cape-based Abortion Law Reform League, founded
in 1971 in response to a doctor's suggestion that legal abortion
would help solve overpopulation. In barely coded language, League
supporters repeatedly spelt out their desire to target lowlier
people, who were breeding too fast. They were 'too stupid or
irresponsible' to use contraception, and were dragging the living
standards of the privileged down (like 'a powerful swimmer
besieged by a mass of struggling, drowning weaklings'.'")
Deploying the imagery of dirt as a racial metaphor, the League
promoted abortion on demand not only as an individual freedom,
but also as population hygiene.41
The Natal-based Abortion Reform Action Group, formed in 1972
in response to both a backstreet death and the proposed
legislation, was far more cautious, not least because key
organizers were black. But it, too, prioritized high rates of
population growth. At a time when mass Natal strikes had ended a
decade of African political quiescence, it appealed to the
politically conservative by linking this spectre to bantustan
land demands. The sexually conservative were also targeted:
although maternity offered many unmarried black women some
fulfilment, ARAG repeatedly associated the illegitimate with the
unwanted.i2 Others, both 'coloured' and white, swelled the
chorus of middle class voices proposing abortion for blacks for
the good of patriarchal morality and civilized government. This
appealed in particular to numerous white male doctors, at least
some of whom assimilated family planning to 'pollution control',
and illegitimate black children to a drain on state coffers.43
Understandably, an African anthropologist angrily claimed blacks
saw legalized abortion as one more culling device.44
Enthusiasm for population control spilled over into another
facet of the pro-choice campaign, which focused on reproductive
technology. Partly in response to limited success in controlling
demographic growth with contraceptives that women resisted,
scientific resources were flowing into what was euphemistically
termed post-conceptual or post-implantation fertility control.
Medical men could and did engage in this new version of cultural
imperialism - and ministers wearily recognized that the
prestigious and powerful were usually victorious in the sphere of
ideas. Nonetheless, like lawyers, men of religion accurately
labelled these commodities as abortifacients.4b So did a white
doctor-cum-population controller, who opposed abortion on demand,
and guesstimated there were some 2000 backstreet terminations a
month in Soweto in 1973. As he also noted, the intra-uterine
device was now promoted among blacks rather than the pill. It was
dirt cheap, could be inserted within hours of childbirth, could
not be removed by the woman herself, and was strongly recommended
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for lower class females who resisted contraception. But as he
well knew, imprisoning a foreign body in a sexually active
woman's womb did not prevent fertilisation. For the fortunate, it
simply induced miscarriages whenever conception occurred. 'This
is a perfectly legal termination' he concluded, having overseen
the insertion of some 20,000 IUDs among black women since the
late 1960s, 'and just as well when one has to admit that one is
responsible for over 20,000 terminations every month.'"
His admission to being an abortionist on this scale was
unusual. Typically, it was only in the privacy of their
professional journals that doctors confessed to subjecting black
women to implantation followed by early abortions, to health
risks remarkably similar to those ofj illegal terminations, and to
a disturbingly high danger of septic! late abortions, with severe
and sometimes deadly complications.0 Nonetheless, it was
impossible either to conceal medical;hypocrisy - or to prevent
women from appropriating the new technology for their own
purposes. The 'loop' effectively caused early miscarriages,
insisted both the League and a Natal Anglican commission on
abortion. Clinics prescribed IUDs when they received requests for
terminations, alleged a convicted abortionist bitterly. Some
doctors inserted an IUD in a woman with an unwanted pregnancy,
admitted a physician. 'They'd put in a loop, and then that would
start, usually would start, bleeding and cramps', explained a
white woman who helped others end unwanted pregnancies. But as
she also warned, 'it's a very, very painful and horrible way of
having an abortion.'*9
In sum: the pregnancies of a tiny minority of women in the
know - and of tens of thousands of unwitting and overwhelmingly
black women - were being terminated with products known to
endanger their health and flout the law. Significantly, at a time
when white South Africa was convulsed with debate about
reproductive morality, the forces of law and order turned a blind
eye. Prosecutors did not rush to charge population controllers or
manufacturers of the world's largest selling IUD with illegal
terminations. Indeed, when this infamous Dalkon Shield was banned
in the United States in 1974 - because too many deaths resulted
from septic late abortions - suppliers dumped them on the Third
World, to the approval of the same South African population
controller responsible for 20,000 terminations a month." Unsafe
abortion on command was clearly both permissible and desirable.
The really disturbing idea was safe abortion on demand.
Interestingly, the pro-choice movement focused on scientific
progress rather than scientific profiteering, misogyny and
racism. Accusing fingers were also wagged at the morning-after
pill, at other new abortifacient drugs like prostaglandins, but
individuals deeply committed to population control concentrated
on the emancipatory potential of the new technologies. Firstly,
they promoted abortion techniques lasting only a few minutes,'
appropriate for paramedical clinics, freeing women from the sway
of a medical elite. Some longed to eliminate specialist
intervention altogether: why not leave decision-making absolutely
to the woman herself, possessed with a 'vacuum pump in her own
do-it-yourself abortion kit?'50 Secondly, they (and others)
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tried to stretch the legal grey area, by challenging the
discourse through which the medical and legal elite constructed
reality. If, for example, the early miscarriages induced by IUDs
were not abortions in the eyes of the law, why not reserve this
word for terminations of pregnancies extending beyond three
months? Indeed, why not substitute the process of 'menstrual
regulation' for early 'abortion' - with techniques inducing late
periods without determining whether the woman was pregnant?
These linguistic and technological shifts of gear had.
considerable political leverage. They reoriented visions: away
from the foetus observed by the detached clinical gaze of the
medical man, towards the late period that was the felt experience
of a pregnant woman. Moreover, although pro-choice supporters
proudly proclaimed the modernity of menstrual regulation, the
wheel was simply turning full circle. Tens of thousands of
African women were simultaneously resorting to over-the-counter
'Tablets for Women' when experiencing late periods. The pills
they favoured had been among the best abortifacient drugs
introduced in the early twentieth century, when they were
enthusiastically embraced by whites." '[E]verybody goes to the
Parade to this herb woman', explained an elderly, church-going,
'coloured' domestic worker in Cape Town.
You say, your monthly didn't come, you're worried...it is
better than going to someone and, and, uh, uh, have
abortion. Abortion is sometimes a big child already. But
that is when it is in the second month or so. You know. That
you feel you didn't get it last month, and then you have to
drink the herbs."
Yet neither the beliefs nor the practices of black working
class women were prominent in reproductive-rights discourse: To
be sure, in a society where many African languages deployed the
same word for mother as for adult female, a fascinating attempt
was made to garner support for abortion on demand by appealing to
maternal identities. 'Our daughters are dying', was the way an
African ARAG activist expressed it.54 In addition, numerous
whites were well aware that abortion legislation stripped of
economic clauses was effectively class law, which in South Africa
meant racist law, discriminating against the vast majority of
women. Poverty, they insisted, was the prime reason an African
woman sought an abortion; the poor had the same right to safe
terminations as the rich who discreetly visited doctors.
Nonetheless, 'the poor' and 'the African' tended to be
rhetorically invoked, not least because they proved an elusive
constituency. As women in the strongly working class township of
KwaMashu asked an ARAG leader: 'How can we fight for these rights
when our men are not free?'" In 1973, whites constituted less
than one-fifth of the populace, but had both the vote and nearly
70% of the income. Africans constituted over 70% of the
population, but received only 21% of the income. The central
political issue was the rights of blacks, not the wrongs of
women."
1?
PRO-CHOICE POLITICS: FEMINISM AND WOMEN
As an organized movement, feminism has historically been
associated primarily with middle class women. The founder and the
secretary of the League - a publisher in her sixties and a
retired doctor - certainly chose this route. Inspired partly by
American feminists, they ridiculed male clerics unable to bear
children dictating to those who could; they compared their battle
for freedom to other all-female struggles for access to male-
exclusive domains. Backed by some 1500 signatures, they also
insisted to Parliamentarians that women be regarded as citizens
with gendered needs. Abortion on demand was thus 'a fundamental
right', 'a human right that every women of any colour should
have'. Why so? Because this had been won in struggle: by the
women's movement sweeping the west. Because, too, those with
unwanted pregnancies could otherwise be reduced to machines or
animals, colonized by an uncontrollable process. In addition,
women had inalienable rights over thjeir own bodies: 'MY UTERUS
BELONGS TO ME'.5B Finally, justice, freedom, dignity and privacy
- for those whose bodies differed fr|om the minority sex -
necessitated abortion on demand. Independent females, insisted
the League, were tired of being treated as madwomen. '[I]n early
pregnancy the meaningful life of the mother - as she reads it -
must at all times take precedence over the life of the fertilized
cell.'5' Others added an additional string to this bow. If both
the state and Protestant churches had ceded that abortion could
be condoned in some cases, argued a female minister-cum-doctor,
then it was unjust for anyone other than the woman concerned to
decide what these circumstances were.60
These were significant assertions, with important political
implications. Admittedly, the association of citizenship or human
status with abortion rights - and the insistence on reproductive
control if liberal slogans were to have meaning for women - had
no impact on deeply conservative male Parliamentarians. But the
lexicon of liberalism and feminism, of individualism and property
rights, certainly had wider resonance - in a constituency that
once more was profoundly shaped by the contours of class and
race. 'I don't really see how the decision concerns anyone but
the mother', argued a female executive; 'it's her body, her
life.'61 At a time when feminist movements were emerging on
university campuses, and the thoroughly respectable Family
Planning Association was displaying posters of a pregnant man
('Would you be more careful if you had become pregnant?'),
support for radical feminism was perhaps greater than anticipated
by pro-choice activists.62 Numerous white women and the
occasional man - all typically those; who were no strangers to
wealth or tertiary education - were certainly willing to pursue
gender issues. They asked why women should suffer and male lovers
escape free. They also denounced arrests of women for abortions
as discrimination; shouted down male priests suggesting wives
might end pregnancies for frivolous reasons; objected to any
single group imposing its morality oh all, and declared that pro-
choice policy would help wives whose marriages subjected them to
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rape and prostitution.*3
Yet in a profoundly patriarchal and authoritarian society,
'women's lib' was little more than a scatological terra of abuse.
The male rector of a so-called liberal university banned the
'pregnant man' poster; some men thought reform was necessary
because the woman, not the abortionist, was the real criminal.
Moreover, antagonism to feminism was hardly confined to men.
Although marriage itself transferred rights over female
fertility, persons, property and children to husbands - including
the rights to rape and to deny contraception - white wives could
be far less troubled by sexism than the black women to whom they
typically bequeathed the drudgery of housework. If they were
discriminated against on gender grounds, they were enormously
advantaged by race. In 1978-9, only 6% of a female sample of
largely middle class white employers of domestic servants
approved of the women's liberation movement. As one tellingly
observed, 'All the women I know are already liberated.'64
Not surprisingly, pro-choice activists tended to trim their
feminism. The League chose to focus first on converting doctors
and social workers; its organizational efforts among females were
initially almost non-existent; it claimed but 207 members in
1974. In the absence of a mass female base, racial prejudices
pulled it inexorably closer towards population controllers. ARAG,
as conservative in the sexual domain as the League was in that of
race, sternly warned against feminism. 'The image of the
literated woman', it proclaimed in a revealing slip, 'is quite
clearly foreign to the portals of our parliament, and point of
contact could easily be sacrificed by this emphasis' ." With
only two members in 1972, and some eighty in 1974, it
demonstrated even less desire or ability to win popular support.
Like other privileged females in Africa, leaders of both
movements had chosen to try to manipulate males rather than
mobilize women. In essence, theirs were legalistic campaigns with
racist overtones, relying on lobbying and endorsements from the
prestigious, addressing themselves in a dignified fashion to the
all-white, almost all-male Parliament. Others were quick to note
these tactics were doomed to failure. As a convicted abortionist
sourly noted, pro-choice women gave press interviews and talked.
Or as the very men they sought to manipulate perceived it,
groupings with such tiny memberships, promoting cock-eyed ideas
about female rights, could be ignored completely."
Leading organizers, frequently cash-strapped, and typically
wives and mothers in full-time jobs, had little choice. Moreover,
they were often dismayed by the lack of white female support even
when they eschewed feminism. Compared to white men, however,
white women tended to be concentrated on the bottom rungs of
income, occupational and educational ladders. Despite dramatic
changes during the boom years, most remained absolutely
financially dependent on males; two-thirds were not employed
outside the home; the great majority had far less access to
tertiary education than men. Since males controlled the
resources, most women were understandably educated not for the
world but for men. Many a woman also firmly adhered to the notion
that her body was meant for children, her mind was infused with
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maternal instincts, her place was in the home. Not only were such
views sanctioned by male-dominated religion, media and medicine:
becoming a mother in a patriarchal family, as the vast majority
of white women did, also offered some power, some emotional
satisfaction, and crucial identities."
Consequently, organizations representing predominantly
housewives, such as the National Council of Women, were
vociferously hostile to pro-choice politics. For many, an induced
miscarriage was a sordid secret which sullied women in the eyes
of men! Abortion was the province of bad girls, bad wives, bad
mothers (and even bad employees - a nurse who had terminated her
pregnancy was then ordered to marry her lover or resign.'8)
Indeed, it was replacing loss of virginity as a signifier of
female vice and impurity. The polar dpposites of abortion and
maternity, on which the media insisted, also deeply worried many
wives." A woman who had terminated one pregnancy anxiously
tried to reposition herself as a 'good mother'. Those who signed
the League's petition for termination on request, she claimed,
were also 'nice, responsible and wonderful mothers'. Desperate to
remain feminine, others who had internalized hegemonic tenets
were too fearful to sign.70
Unfortunately for pro-choice activists, anxiety about
motherhood was not simply male-imposed false consciousness. There
was also good physiological reason, located in the very body that
supposedly belonged to a pregnant woman. For her, a foetus was
not necessarily a person - but it was certainly in her, of her,
becoming a child through a pregnant body that was itself changing
dramatically. No woman, claimed one who had terminated her third
pregnancy, and was haunted by the memory of 'the tiny life',
could have an abortion without distress and regret.71 Female
needs and actions were often in conflict with bodies, beliefs and
emotions. It was not that they had made the wrong decision. Those
who returned three, four, even eight times for abortions added
weight to the claims of others that guilt would not deter them
from such a course.72 'It should be up to the woman' declared a
white teenager, who supported legalization and thought marriage
to her lover would have been as bad. But for months after her own
termination, 'I felt very dirty and a non kind of person.'73
Typically, women expressed considerable shame, grief, ambivalence
- and simultaneously relief and conviction that their decisions
had been correct. Yet in the polarize?! political debate, as some
pro-choice leaders talked of fertilized cells and guiltless
females, their right to all these feelings was not validated.
In part, too, this was because pro-choice groups were barely
shaped by a crucial constituency. The voice of those who had
terminated pregnancies, as one bitterly noted, was conspicuous by
its absence.74 The route they had travelled in reaching their
decisions was also obscured, not least because organizers trying
to manipulate men were talking a different language. They spoke
of rights, of research, of reasons for liberalizing the law; they
contested arguments and provided academic explanations. ('CAUSES
OF UNWANTED PREGNANCIES. 7.1. Lack of Education with attendant
irresponsibility...the average Coloured wife interviewed has no
knowledge of contraceptive measures.'75) But in addition to its
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obvious class and racial biases, such a discourse is not gender-
neutral. In morally ambiguous situations, Carol Gilligan has
claimed in examining abortion in America, male perspectives
revolve around abstract, allegedly rational rules and rights
which contribute to constructing their masculinity; those of
women around their responsibilities in concrete situations, and a
desire to minimize pain." Greater class and racial specificity
might add weight to this argument, but undoubtedly most South
Africans seeking abortions were in a different world from pro-
choice activists. They were wrestling with needs rooted in very
specific contexts; enmeshed in a web of competing ideas and
pressures, they were typically very far from irresponsible.
Consider another 'Coloured [ex-]wife interviewed' - and how
she represented her unwanted pregnancy. As a divorcee from a
working class background in 1975, she in fact had considerable
knowledge about birth control. But like so many others, she fell
pregnant because women have minds as well as bodies, and
contraceptives acquire cultural connotations. 'I've always heard
people say, it's necessary to take a break, to give your body a
break from this foreign thing' she recalled, explaining why she
periodically abstained from the pill. As a working single mother,
she had already experienced the difficulties and remorse of
coping alone, of effectively depriving her child of both father
and mother. As a woman pregnant with her second baby, she also
felt shame: 'here I am having a loose child, and it's a white
man's child, at a time when you know, it's just not on.' She was
barred from marrying her lover - by law and his own desires. She
was also working full-time in a white collar job, and trying to
further her education. 'I needed to improve my situation because
I needed to look after [my daughter]...the social security's bad
in this place... no-one's going to take care of you, you have to
be responsible' . She certainly wrestled with competing ethical
claims: weighing up 'killing a life' with giving birth to a baby
she could not afford to provide with what she considered children
needed. She also experienced considerable ambivalence about her
ultimate decision, not least because her own morality was
impugned. Close to death in hospital, she confessed to her
backstreet abortion. 'Horrors! You know. What a horrible
person.'" But as a woman who put her own life at risk, having
weighed up what having a baby mean to her existing child and
herself, having considered the prospective life of her unborn
child in a society that paid minimal attention to the needs of
black parents and children, she was acting like innumerable
females. She was making a hard, morally responsible decision, in
a situation where 'You have a limited choice', where 'There was
nothing else to do' ,79 The choice between an abortion and an
undesirable marriage, or becoming a single mother, or abandoning
a baby to the care of others (or no-one); the choice between
terminating a pregnancy and imposing greater hardships on
existing children, or being forced out of school or out of a job;
the choice between the chance of dying and the certainty of
suffering did and does not offer much freedom of manoeuvre.
Yet the context in which women took painful decisions was
not of prime concern to abortion-rights activists. An Indian
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mother of three girls, for examp.le, 'appropriated the right to
choose: she died in the course of ending a pregnancy because she
feared she was bearing a fourth daughter, when her husband wanted
a son.79 But pro-choice activists typically veiled the
inequalities and power relations, the oppressive institutions and
histories, underlying such terrifying 'choices'. Instead, they
often patronised or denigrated the wpmen themselves as they
focused on persuading a white male elite of the justice of
abortion on request. ('Estimated cost to the State of fatherless
Coloured - R14 000 000 per year' .80) Whether by harping on the
so-called social costs of illegitimacy, population growth and
backstreet abortions, or by articulating a liberal feminist
ideology couched in universal claims, middle class reformers were
blurring the experiences of women they claimed to represent, and
obscuring the contexts imprisoning them. The key issue for
feminists, as Rosalind Petchesky has argued, is not so much
women's abstract rights, let alone the burdens borne by the
state. It is rather women's needs, rooted in concrete
historically determined circumstances, which brutally constrain
their choices.81
DOCTORS AND ABORTION: 'MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS PROTECTION BILL'
Worldwide, twentieth century doctors have been almost as central
in liberalizing legal access to abortion as they were in
criminalizing it in the nineteenth century. In South Africa,
their class profile boded well for a repetition of metropolitan
trends. In 1977, reaping the rewards of long years of tertiary
education, the average general practitioner earned more than 93%
of all taxpayers {excluding Africans). In addition, the changed
worldviews of their counterparts affected even the most
conservative. As a deeply religious qloctor asserted, the argument
that a human life existed from the moment of conception was
antique, absurd, extra-Biblical. 'Reate (rights) behoort aan
persone. en die ongebore fetus is nog geen persoon nie'.'"
If the unborn in early pregnancy were not 'people' for most
doctors, mothers and children were. The prevalence of abandoned
black babies dying of malnutrition, the morbidity and mortality
consequent upon backstreet abortions* the strain oh hospitals
(and blood transfusion services) as victims filled.uuallft quarter
to a third of gynaecological wards: these concentra®«|jithe minds
of some. Like the South African College of Medicirifwjj}!
Baragwanath gynaecologist stressed that illegal terituaations
imperilled the poor and posed a colossal problem. Atjf'^ ihe single
hospital catering for one of the biggest urban conglomerations in
Africa,
We treat between 15 and 20 induced abortion cases a day. And
we see only a fraction of the number of abortions that do
take place...They come to the hospital in a shocking state.
Some have lost about one-eighth of their blood. In their
insides are pieces of wood, barbed wire, knitting needles or
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some virulent solution...if we think she can take it, we
perform a D and C operation. And then we'll probably find a
hole in the uterus. Then we have to open her belly and take
out the uterus. She's probably only 17 years old.83
Yet the perforated wombs of blacks were not high on doctors'
agendas. Instead, a profession that in 1973 was almost 90% white,
almost 90% male, shuffled African women to the margins of the
abortion story. 'The Bantu are a closed book', declared one
doctor-expert on terminations blandly, when asked about black
attitudes to abortion.84 To the profound ignorance of many was
added lack of interest in enlightenment. Illicit 'therapeutic'
abortions, it seems, were performed overwhelmingly for whites.
Africans allegedly induced their own miscarriages; no white
doctor was 'going to be so sympathetic towards a black person' as
to terminate her pregnancy.85 Impelled into the fray largely by
a desire to legalize their lawbreaking, most doctors certainly
attached connotations of whiteness to the category 'woman'.
How did South African physicians define 'the woman'?
According to the hegemonic view, females were separate and
subordinate, their lives fundamentally determined by one
biological feature distinguishing them from males. Like racists
fixated on skin colour, medical men stressed and degraded her
reproductive system. Her existence revolved around this 'Heath
Robinson invention'; her mind, attractiveness and 'need to be
courted or groomed' all followed ovarian rhythms (which accounted
for her unpredictability); her main physiological function was
producing children, which (somehow) explained her ability to 'do
work that not many men would consider' ."' Patriarchal medical
culture supplemented patriarchal medical science. At South
African conferences, there would be 'Ladies' Programmes' for
doctors' wives. (Female physicians were invisible.) In 1975, one
such event included a drama programme ('A Woman's World'), a tour
to Sandton ('which abounds in boutiques'), a trip to a produce
market ('surely a "must" for all wives'), and an 'exceptionally
interesting visit to the African township of Soweto'.87
Prevalent assumptions about class, race and gender could hardly
have been broadcast more loudly. Doctors were white,-male and
intellectual; blacks were exotica; women were decorative
housewives, immersed in a bourgeois, ladylike world.
For many medical men, it followed as night followed day that
those who abandoned their male-defined places had to be forcibly
reinstated. From the late 1960s, as the ratio of female to male
students at one medical school approached the ominous level of
one in five, authorities imposed quotas, bluntly refused
individuals entry, or declared that females might have to be
barred completely.88 An alarmed delegate to an American
conference also reported that feminists were demonstrating
against gynaecologists, threatening to hold them responsible for
backstreet abortions. Admittedly, their South African
counterparts were far more sedate, but up to eight women a week,
pouring into consulting rooms, all clamouring for terminations,
trying to dictate to doctors, drove home an equally unpalatable
message. For many, such patients did not have problems: they were
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problems - a 'mushrooming social evil' ." Consequently, they
were publicly denounced in crowded waiting rooms, or deliberately
subjected to painful internal examinations. (When she protested,
recalled an Indian woman, she was told 'I had enjoyed "sleeping
around" and that now I had to face the consequences'.90)
Collective action supplemented punishments meted out in the
privacy of consulting rooms. Threatened as a profession - by
women abandoning roles deemed appropriate by medical science, by
intellectually and economically inferior lay people debating when
doctors should perform abortions - many joined battle. They were
led by the white male guardians of the profession. Significantly,
these men were typically neither representative of nor
accountable to ordinary doctors. Forgone thing, specialists
tended to hold more conservative views than general
practitioners, subject to constant pressure from patients. <In a
1975 survey of the latter in Natal, 40% favoured terminations on
demand.) For another, control of medical associations had
increasingly passed into the hands of state-sanctioned appointees
and Afrikaners who were, as ARAG sourly expressed it,
' verkrampt'." Rendered elitist and conservative by privilege,
racism, sexism and affirmative action, these luminaries
distinguished themselves by being to the right of the governments
of John Vorster and Gatsha Buthelezi on the issue of abortion.
As in Britain, the crucial obstetrician-gynaecologist
patriarchy outdid all others. For these specialists - 95% of whom
were white men - deskilling was also at stake. Engaging in
vigorous crafts-unionism, many refused to be reduced to
technicians, unable to utilise their expertise because hospitals,
particularly those treating blacks, would be packed with patients
demanding abortions." Their raw anger was more than adequately
distilled by the Afrikaner President]of the Society of
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists. He was also central in
formulating the policy of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk on
terminations; he thought a pregnant woman's desire for an
abortion was hormonally induced; he subsequently became a patron
of the Pro-Life movement. To be sure* he went through the motions
of consulting members, including the pro-choice minority of
perhaps 25%. But when he drew up a memorandum in the name of the
Society, it reflected only the most conservative of opinions.93
When he spoke to it with two other white males, one was a
population controller with the schizoid ability to condemn almost
all abortions, while vigorously promoting lUDs among blacks. When
the opinions of those they supposedly represented were canvassed
in Natal in 1975, 71% thought the memorandum too conservative."
It was, however, of little relevance what they thought. An
organization had substituted itself for gynaecologists; spokesmen
had substituted themselves for the organization; a President's
document had substituted itself for the spokesmen.
If male medical dissidents could be suppressed by
sacrificing internal democracy, WASP women were an even easier
target. Having annexed abortion as medical terrain, various white
male cartels engaged in vicious gender struggles as they
vigorously defended their turf. Interestingly, the one discourse
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they largely eschewed was that of physical health. The fact that
childbirth was a greater risk than a legal abortion, the fact
that opposing reform in the name of true womanhood too often
resulted in a 'grossly infected, necrotic or gangrenous uterus':
these items of information were conspicuous by their absence.'5
Instead, as medical men translated older religious
condemnations into the code of psychiatry, they infused content
into claims that doctors treated females like idiot children. A
woman wanted an abortion? 'Very often', diagnosed an eminent
professor, 'they end up spending three months in hospital because
they are mentally ill' ." She thought pregnancy was a serious
threat to her mental health? So did 75% of women who sneaked
through the British Abortion Act; South Africans should rather be
committed to psychiatric hospitals. She threatened suicide? Once
again, she should be incarcerated in an institution or given
shock treatment." Could she be referred to Britain instead? The
South African Medical Council sternly ruled that any doctor who
was an accessory to an illegal act, 'irrespective of where the
contravention occurs, exposes himself to disciplinary action by
the Council.'98 Her already precarious physical health might
deteriorate in the course of a pregnancy? The foetus -
conceptualized as male - had a right to life; in any event the
decision would have to be referred to her lover or husband."
She supported abortion on demand? She was one of those 'inflamed
zealots' who had to be brought to her senses; in his interview
with an ARAG representative, the Chairman of the Medical Council
performed this task by fondling her thigh under the table,
forcing her to leave the room. 00 This was a Bill to legalize
certain abortions? It would fail if the existing number of
terminations approved by medical men increased; the number of
wives giving birth or babies for adoption should on no account
decrease.101 She had an alcoholic husband and nine children? She
was a teenager with an incestuous relationship with her
stepfather? She was under sixteen and had therefore been legally
raped? 'Ons kan nie op daardie grond 'n sertifikaat gee nie.'102
All they wanted, insisted these luminaries, was a law
legalizing past practices, while according maximum weight to
their own expertise. 'He should be the first man' to advise on a
termination, urged the President of the Society of Obstetricians
and Gynaecologists on behalf of his speciality.103 That the
black woman herself might have some say - let alone the first and
final decision - was beyond the imaginations of those concerned
exclusively with pegging white abortions at their existing
levels, and with pecking orders among white men. Not that the
views of the creme da la creme were widely contested: many whites
agreed that doctors should be in the forefront of decision-
making. Indeed, a Christian grouping perceptively suggested the
name of the draft legislation be changed: to the 'MEDICAL
PRACTITIONERS PROTECTION BILL."04
CHURCHES AND ABORTION: 'PROMISCUITY' IN A 'PERMISSIVE' SOCIETY
Although church practices and theology had for centuries made
second class citizens of females, Christianity, not politics or
feminism, gave many women a role in the public domain. Pro-choice
activists sadly recognized that those who had internalized the
conservative message of most churches - to which some 98% of
white women belonged - were particularly opposed to their
position. Their arguments must, after all, have seemed bizarre to
those worshipping under the Greek Orthodox Archbishop. Rather
than abortion for a raped pregnant woman, he urged that the
rapist be forced to marry his victim. ftnd he should not be
allowed to divorce her unless he committed adultery.105
If Christianity and misogyny w(ere effectively identical for
some men of religion, a wedge was being driven between
Christianity and anti-abortion absolutism. Living in a class-
differentiated society linked to the wider world was taking a
toll. Some whites were insisting that the equation of early
terminations with sin was simply a notion propagated in some
centuries, by some people, with very particular interests.
Anglicans, who in the 1960s had urged that a stern anti-abortion
message be imparted in pre-baptism, confirmation and marriage
instruction, demonstrated this in practice. A 1973 Natal
commission, consisting entirely of professionals addressing
primarily the province's white English-speaking elite, found that
abortion on request was 'an ideal towards which society should be
aiming'.106 Most religious bodies were far more conservative,
but it was widely accepted that secylarity, science and gender
transformations had rendered key beliefs outmoded. Humanity from
the moment of conception jarred with the absence of baptisms,
burials and death certificates when miscarriages occurred, it was
conceded. Doctors had the right to perform 'therapeutic'
terminations. These could be permissible when there were
conflicts of interest between the foetus and the mother.101
These ideological shifts were fuelled by pressures from
below. Although most Catholics adhered to the worldview of their
male superiors, a surprisingly large number was also challenging
the orthodox opposition to all abortions (as well as to female
equality and contraception.108) God would prefer terminations to
having too many suffering people in an overpopulated world,
argued one woman. Others were more daring in reading the mind of
the Lord. 'God was on our side...and I have saved the happiness
of many women', claimed a white midwife running a Johannesburg
'hospital', providing abortions for up to twenty females a
day.109 Caught between the pincers of subversive ideas from
below, and metropolitan thought from above, numerous white
religious bodies welcomed the draft legislation, proposed minor
amendments, or simply asked for more time since opinion was
divided.110
Far and away the most forceful opposition derived not from
English-speaking Catholic organizations, as comparative history
would suggest, but from churches associated with Afrikaner
nationalism. The Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk - to which two in
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five whites belonged - carried particular weight. Throughout the
1960s, it was riven with conflict as to whether the Bible
permitted contraceptives. In the early 1970s, it called for state
controls, because the God-given sex drive existed solely to
reproduce. More to the point: opposition to birth control had
political as well as theological dimensions. For one thing, the
church acknowledged that disseminating ideas about contraception
would 'accelerate the collapse of the White nation'.111 For
another, NGK male ministers had an illustrious past of
proclaiming that God and the Bible opposed votes for women, work
for women, women who were not mothers within patriarchal homes.
They had a long history, too, of suggesting that feminism
undermined the nationalist cause. After all, educated women,
independent women, women entering public life, were allegedly the
single most important cause of falling white birth rates.1"
So far as abortion was concerned, gender and nationalist
politics once again coincided with the will of the Lord. To an
even greater extent than medical men, the church eschewed
consulting dissidents, such as Pretoria-based NGK doctors who
favoured terminations on demand. Instead, an all-male commission
in the northern Transvaal interpreted the Bible as follows. High
fertility rates were important to God the Father; the foetus was
alive from the moment of conception; abortion was therefore
murder, forbidden under all circumstances; due to the sinful
reality of the world, certain terminations were permissible. If
this hinted at male irrationality, there was perhaps more
evidence for racism, elitism and sexism. The woman seeking a
termination was conceptualized as white; the poor mother was
imagined as one with 'geen bedlendes, wasmasjiene'.'" But since
reproduction allegedly gave meaning to her life, since the last
six months of pregnancy could be her happiest ever, abortions had
to be granted on far more restrictive terms than either doctors
or the draft legislation proposed.
Thus terminating the pregnancies of raped women was highly
problematic. And out tumbled myths so archetypal, so permeated
with the projection of male aggression and sexuality onto
females, that these obscure Afrikaners deserve admission to a
worldwide fraternity. By the mid-1970s, South Africa had the
unenviable distinction of the highest rape rate in the world. But
these learned men did not merely sidestep the issue of male
violence: they also turned rape into an attack by the woman on
the man. Charges were almost invariably fabricated, they
declared. The unmarried woman was often motivated by sexual
disappointment or unpredictable emotions; she might have
initially tempted the man and then become scared. Moreover, they
garrulously insisted, even if she offered half-hearted resistance
at the start, her 'genieting', her ' volkome ontsluit', her
'klimax', was almost invariably present at the end.114
Having constructed this extraordinarily prurient image,
these professional men then proceeded to overlay other unwanted
pregnancies with their pornographic fantasies. Their views were
then transmitted to various NGK committees for the Promotion of
Public Morality; ultimately, the male hierarchy moved only a
millimetre away from the old doctrine that life-threatening
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circumstances were the only grounds for an abortion. Rape was
out. So were terminations for those under sixteen. Little girls
were sexually precocious; the spectre loomed of ' grootskaalse
lighartige ontug onder skooldogters' . "5 Incest was not
acceptable either. Had not Lot's daughters wilfully seduced their
father - and did not their pregnancies go to term? Moreover,
sexual games between most siblings were allegedly over by age
seventeen. But if access to abortion was dangled before them,
then ''n broer en suster vrolik sou kon voortgaan' ."'
Afrikaans homes inhabited by incestuous couples and teenage
nymphomaniacs: good Christian men were seemingly haunted by
images of female libidos, held in check - if at all - only by
fear of pregnancy. Yet peculiar as the dynamics of patriarchal
Afrikaner families might have been, the vryery of the volk cannot
explain these deeply disturbed hallucinations. Firstly, these
emanated from minds long deranged by the madness of nationalism.
At a time when the Broederbond, chaired by a Dutch Reformed
minister, was urging white immigration to counter falling
fertility among Afrikaners, opposing all abortions was surely the
least contribution the NGK could make to the cause.111 Secondly,
if its antagonism to terminations was therefore greater than that
of most English-speaking churches and synagogues, its obsession
with female sexuality merely exaggerated the ecclesiastical norm.
These institutional guardians of sexual morality spawned
processions of white men, solemnly opposing liberal reform on the
grounds that fear of pregnancy was indispensable in keeping
daughters chaste, wives faithful, sex restricted to married
couples. (According to an Anglican minister, many Protestant
churches were reluctant to accept terminations on request
precisely due to their 'fear of encouraging promiscuous
sexuality'.ae) The wanton youth was clearly of enormous concern
to many, and once again afforded middle-aged men the opportunity
for sermons infused with repressed longings. (Couples were
'consorting with each other unblushingly, in public and alone, in
spaces, either closed, in subdued light, or in complete darkness,
or open, in fields, in motor cars...'1") 'Promiscuity' in a
'permissive society': this, not unwanted pregnancy, was the
central concern of many clerics. For those unable to bear
children, the most disturbing issue was unmarried white women
conducting their sex lives as though they were men.
Interestingly, while medical men had targeted the fertility
of the white mother, and many churches the sexuality of the white
teenager, the focus shifted to wealthier white women among some
fundamentalists. In the hostile words of Baptists, 'the middle
and upper classes seek abortion more frequently than the lower
classes'.12° In an era when many churches were abandoning older
values, and when both social stratification and gender
transformations were proceeding apace, anti-abortion sentiments
fusing class hostility and anti-feminism were waiting to be
tapped among marginalized English-speakers. A badly spelt
document, sprinkled with capitals for emphasis, from Westonaria's
Full Gospel Church of God; emotive handwritten appeals to Members
of Parliament, often the same letter copied by people in
embryonic 'pro-life' organizations: these did not derive from the
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professional elite. Typically, these white English-speaking women
and men identified themselves simply by name, or as 'people with
families'; they argued that women had maternal instincts, and men
had rights, which had to be 'set over against those which are
alleged to be solely her's'.121 Using the vocabulary of American
Pro-Life publications - which skilfully stressed class
resentments - they warned that South Africa's Watergate loomed as
'the sluice gates of vice' flooded their country.1" They wanted
their Parliamentarians to prohibit, completely, all abortions,
all murders of the most defenceless and weak.
Once again, this was colour-coded morality - somewhat more
pronounced than the racist norm. Vulnerable social groups were
identifying with the white unborn ('99,9% of them will be
white'.'") The black weak and defenceless - 'as many as half
their children in rural areas at least will be corpses by the age
of five years' - completely escaped their field of vision.1"
Yet the point was not simply that these fundamentalists were
racist. Nor was it that too many seemed to believe life began at
fertilization and ended at birth. Rather, the point was that by
initiating a debate on abortion, an elite located in a very
different social milieu was directly attacking them.
Understandably, the less educated, less privileged, less
committed to birth control, resented these professionals
promoting a 'pernicious new intellectualism', and propounding
middle class notions of planned children with a good quality of
life.1" They also opposed physicians favouring abortion if a
child would not be socially useful, and a selfish meritocracy
allegedly seeking to.destroy the weak and select the strong.
After all, where would an elite obsessed with the population
explosion draw the line? If abortion were justifiable, would
there not be calls for euthanasia 'when I am old and grey and
possibly occupying a hospital bed in an even more overcrowded
world?'126 Deeply threatened by ranking of human beings, many
fiercely rejected social criteria for abortions. They turned to
religion and biology instead. All were equal at the moment of
conception; God was an authority greater than any secular force.
Although they ignored an elite palpably attacking the
vulnerable - the aged, the unproductive, the 'superfluous
appendages such as [African] wives' - white fundamentalists were
ideologically and economically close to a large black
constituency.127 The appeal of pro-natalist African Zionist
churches to the downtrodden is well known. They were generally
profoundly conservative in both political and sexual domains
(condemning not only promiscuity but dancing, films, all
medication); their female membership alone in the early 1970s was
well over a million and rapidly rising. Perhaps less familiar are
the religious choices of those who were typically slightly better
educated. In 1970 the NGK had almost a million African members;
the Catholic church, with considerably more, was an
overwhelmingly black movement. When the Trankeian wife of a
migrant labourer, six of whose nine children had died, decided to
seek help from God, she selected the Catholics as best 'for poor
people like myself: a poignant indication of the potential for a
cross-racial alliance of black mothers and white 'pro-
lifers' .l28 So was the fact that not one of a class-
differentiated group of twenty-eight women in the backwaters of
this bantustan supported abortion for a single mother ('a great
sin to kill a child',12') Ironically, a pro-choice organization
like ARAG, which made the greatest efforts to cross racial
boundaries, had infinitely less ideological appeal to millions of
blacks than patriarchal 'pro-lifers', who utterly ignored the
majority of the population.
POLITICIANS AMD ABORTION: 'MURDERING ONE'S NATION'
Who was to judge whose rights outweighed whose, asked white
fundamentalists repeatedly. Politicians from the racist
Parliament was the answer. More specifically, the same ten,
middle-aged, white, male politicians constituted the Select
Committee and Commission of Inquiry of 1973-4. They more than
adequately represented the medical profession and Afrikaner male
elite: half were doctors; seven belonged to the Nationalist
Party; at least two (including the chairman) were Broederbond
members. A future Minister of Health explained why those capable
of falling pregnant were not present. Women were redundant when
making moral judgements, claimed Dr Munnik loftily; 'if one
wanted to abolish capital punishment today, surely one would not
appoint a bunch of murderers to go into the matter'.13°
If white women were beyond the pale, these committee-men
nonetheless held strong opinions on their essential natures.
Either they were 'on a pedestal' (unless toppled by abortion to a
subhuman status), or they were sexually voracious, 'at it all
night. Next morning, you're still at it. And then you get off
your beds and find you're pregnant'.131 Madonna or whore:
medical and clerical male stereotypes clearly loomed large in the
minds of these elected representatives. Once again, black females
were marginalized. Men, too, were shunted to the sidelines. The
problem instead was 'these ladies', who, unwilling to take
responsibility for (parthenogenetic?) sex, allegedly contributed
to the great bulk of an estimated 100,000 abortions each
year.1"
Once these preconceptions had been brought to bear on the
prejudices saturating most written and oral submissions - 1*
derived from those whose skin colour was other than pink, over
half were from medical or religious bodies - a draconian law
emerged. Although an NGK minister boasted this was due to the
influence of his church, the baton had passed to the medical
profession - and to the obstetrician-gynaecological speciality in
particular. As in the metropoles and in white South Africa at
large, misogynist men with technical expertise had been accorded
legitimacy as the central authority on female fertility. (Or as
Helen Suzman of the Progressive Party expressed it to a
gynaecologist, 'your damned colleagues' were responsible for the
reactionary changes.133) True, apparatchiks would not budge on
what doctors found bizarre. Since the chairman effectively
3
equated abortion with barrenness, the law continued to straddle
both terminations and sterilization of those classified mentally
retarded. In other respects, it was very closely based on the
proposals of the Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists.
What were the contents of this legislation? State regulation
of female bodies would be mediated by physicians in general, and
by state-employed doctors in particular. But sincj:e the Society
was obsessed with overly liberal practitioners, the law limited
medical discretion. Rape, incest and imbecility all remained
legitimate grounds for doctors to consider. Gone was the
provision for abortion after statutory rape. Gone were almost all
conceivable loopholes in other clauses. (Thus a pregnancy could
be terminated for psychological reasons only if the mental
disorder that might otherwise ensue was permanent - of the order
of brain damage.) Gone was any commitment to truth by
functionaries of a state that had increasingly abandoned notions
of the rule of law or freedom of expression. There were 11,500
signatures supporting abortion on request? They disappeared from
print and from sight, frozen in the archives for the next fifty
years. There were numerous representations favouring a more
liberal law? The committee-men mendaciously asserted that except
for one organization (the League), everyone wanted terminations
only in exceptional circumstances. There were statistics offered
in a verbal presentation, indicating that abortions were
concentrated among Africans - and were running at 14-20
admissions a day at Baragwanath, an estimated 40% of them septic?
They were simply omitted from the published report. Mouthing the
rhetoric of abiding by the democratic will of the nation, vice
paid tribute to virtue with censorship and lies.135
In early 1975, the final say rested with the legislature,
allegedly the sovereign body within the state. This lily-white
institution contained Suzman as the sole woman; its shallow
political culture was deeply misogynist; most of its members
believed that discrimination against females was essential.
(Aside from justifications revolving around women being created
from male ribs, this was because 'One of the two must have
control, and...that person must be the man'.136) Naively hoping
for liberal reform, numerous white women encountered
parliamentary cretinism instead. Incapable of representing their
interests, the vaunted Westminster system of democracy for whites
largely rendered them politically invisible. With a handful of
exceptions, male leaders did not articulate concerns of the
female led; many were not even accessible. Afrikaner women
supporting the Nationalist Party wasted their time in asking
their representative to voice their problems in the legislature.
Similarly, ARAG supporters found it impossible to buttonhole key
Parliamentarians; they could not extract public answers to their
questions; with pompous mendacity, the United Party spokesman on
the Select Committee declared the matter sub judice.1" The
sanctum that supposedly represented the will of the white nation
was little more than an aggressively manipulative, aggressively
masculine, aggressively racist, white man's club.
Its members were, however, spellbound by the legislation
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placed before them by self-proclaimed law-makers. Before rubber-
stamping it, politicians who disagreed on almost every other
topic flocked to articulate canonical wisdom. Thus pregnant women
who wanted abortions were 'hormonally drugged', unable due to
their 'ductless glands' to make rational decisions.138 The rape
clause was ultimately sanctioned as an indulgence to 'Women's
Lib', but not before men swopped endless jokes about sex-starved
women who 'were raped very easily, very easily indeed'.1" Only
fifteen females advocated abortion on demand, proclaimed the
Minister of Health, adding snidely that they enjoyed the support
of thousands of men. Dissatisfied with smearing pro-choicers
merely with promiscuity or ultra-liberalism, a future organizer
of the 'pro-life' lobby claimed abortion on demand led to
dialectical materialism, totalitarianism, the 'gas chambers, the
Stalin purges', and, clearly, political death.1"
What is madness to some is sanity to others. For many
members of the white brotherhood, this was the voice of reason.
Anti-feminism saturated these anti-abortion sentiments - but
female reproductive capacities had to be controlled by the state
in the interests of white as well as masculine supremacy. Thus
the notion of decreasing black births through a population
control programme incorporating legal abortion clearly had some
appeal. Unfortunately, this allegedly never worked in 'primitive
societies'; in any event, 'only a very irresponsible Government
would think only of one part of the population, such as the Black
people.'1" A government that thought white men were a rather
more significant sector had an able ideologue in Dr Munnik, who
seized the opportunity of explaining why white women's
reproductive capacities were more important than their minds or
their rights. There were those, he declared, who believed of a
female that
she alone has say over her own body. Sir, a pregnancy does
not affect the mother only. A pregnancy affects the mother
and it affects the foetus and it affects the father and it
affects the doctors who are involved in the case; it affects
the State and it affects the very being of the nation - in
fact, it affects the soul of the nation because it
determines whether the nation will survive or whether it
will deteriorate and disappear... If one allows abortion on
demand one is murdering one's nation.142
His argument was both compelling and illuminating. For
politicians, imperialist claims to female bodies were motivated
primarily by nationalism, infused with but followed by
patriarchy. Consequently in 1975, when some 60% of the world's
population had access to abortion for socio-economic reasons,
when Britain, the United States, France, Austria and Sweden had
all legalized first trimester abortion on request, the apartheid
state resuscitated the policies of Nazi Germany. A woman's body
belonged to the volk; sterilization would eradicate the
unfit."3 Or as a black abortionist expressed it, taunting a
white student before inducing her miscarriage, abortion was
illegal in South Africa 'because the state wants white
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yet male fiat could not even curb, let alone eradicate, a
practice rooted in the political economy of dire female need. At
most, the threat of five years imprisonment and/or a R5000 fine
caused a temporary retreat by white doctors and nursing homes
previously offering discreet terminations. Some of their clients
were therefore pushed onto the backstreets: abortion-related
admissions to private hospitals in Natal increased by a third in
the year after the passage of the law. For the wealthy, the
alternative was the price of an air ticket away. South African
women were spending some seven million rands a year on obtaining
terminations abroad, estimated a gynaecologist in early 1977.145
Among the poor, the law had almost no impact whatsoever. The
same year it was passed, a woman in her thirties fell pregnant in
Cape Town. Like one in three employed African women, she was a
domestic worker: poorly paid, vulnerable to dismissal on
pregnancy, without legal access to maternity benefits or
unemployment insurance. Like many black women, top, she was a
single mother, supporting with her paltry wages not only her
child but also her lover. She 'didn't want this baby, because the
father of the baby was not working, you know. He was, just kind
of cool, didn't like to work'.146
She delayed her abortion, as did many black working women
with other pressures on their time and resources - including
lovers who wanted pregnancies carried to term. Five months
pregnant, having waited anxiously for a night when her boyfriend
was away, she underwent an abortion in her room. The prating of
white men in a Parliament less than ten miles away, their rulings
that four doctors were needed before a termination was granted,
might as well have occurred on the moon. A domestic worker friend
simply followed the instructions of a char-cum-abortionist
acquaintance. She first boiled a decoction of gin and Dutch
medicines used by nineteenth century Afrikaner women for the same
purpose. Then she inserted a catheter bought from a chemist. She
used no gloves: non-sterile conditions were as typical as late
terminations among the poor. She took slightly longer than usual
to push it in, she reckoned - five minutes rather than three. 'I
was a bit scared, you know', although 'in our township, you
always hear about the catheter.' The following day, the woman was
found half-conscious behind her locked door, lying on a pile of
bloody newspapers next to a five month aborted foetus. So far as
hospitals were concerned, she entered statistics as one more
septic abortion.1*7
In the years to come, black youths would try to stamp out
what the white man's law was patently incapable of controlling.
During the 1976 uprising, one of the student demands was
'Everybody get pregnant or we'll be wiped out' - and birth
control was on the boycott list along with Bantu Education.1"
During the next major insurrection of 1984-6, Pedi youths
bitterly opposed the ubiquity of abortions while they were dying
for their cause. They patrolled a slum in a bantustan singing:
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Informers, we will destroy you. Haai! Haai!
Witches, we will burn you. Haai! Haai!
Those who commit abortions, you will be destroyed. Haai! Haai!
Mrs Botha is barren - she gives birth to rats. Haai! Haai!
Mrs Mandela is fertile - she gives birth to comrades. Haai!
Haai! Haai! Haai! Haai!14'
Unlike other major anti-abortion social forces, such youths
helped usher in a new political era. But like them, they were
identifying women with their racially classified wombs. If an
enormous chasm separated black from white females, they had one
feature in common. Their needs were subordinated to those of
patriarchy and nationalism. And they paid a heavy price: with
their blood, with their bodies, with their lives.
CONCLUSION
In 1975, a 99% white male Parliament passed a law for white men,
to control white women, in the name of apartheid South Africa. It
was based on the illusion that abortions were concentrated among
the dominant race; it was much more restrictive than the
legislation originally proposed; it encoded the views of a
society of gynaecologists. These were otherwise known as those of
the 'pro-life' President of the most conservative medical body,
located within an overwhelmingly white male profession
constituting 0,1% of the South African adult population.
Understandably, gynaecologists congratulated themselves on
procuring a 'law made for doctors, not for the people'.150
Mouldering in the archives, there were more signatures
supporting abortion on request than there were physicians in
South Africa. Yet there were underlying reasons for the passage
of such a law in the heyday of apartheid, in International
Women's Year, in a period when IUD-induced terminations were
probably far and away the most common type of abortion. Firstly,
democracy in a patriarchal, capitalist society is a contradiction
in terms. Those with property, power and organizational dominance
hati both motive and ability to defend their privileges and
disseminate their views. The clash of opposing opinions, when
parties to the conflict were profoundly unequal, had a
predictable result. Medical men outflanked dominees and whites
unable to spell; leaders outwitted the rank and file;
pharmaceutical companies and population controllers flouted the
law; white men laid down rules for black and white women who had
played no part in formulating them.
Secondly, democracy for the minority is also a contradiction
in terms. The maintenance of white supremacy overrode almost
everything, generating a pathological body politic in which
arbitrary power was exercised by the megalomaniac and the mad. To
ensure that white females continued to breed, ministers opposed
terminations for the raped because they had orgasms. A self-
proclaimed abortionist responsible for 20,000 black terminations
a month opposed abortion on demand. An overwhelmingly white pro-
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choice movement sanctioned the imposition of abortions on the
black poor, while the Medical Council threatened disciplinary
action if a second opinion about an unwanted white pregnancy was
sought in Britain. Police, politicians and doctors suppressed
evidence to bolster the delusion that 99,9% of terminations
occurred among whites, and Parliamentarians raving about
Stalinist purges equated all white women to murderers. The
question as to who should have been incarcerated in psychiatric
institutions does not appear to have been adequately answered.
What of today? There are two key differences between then
and now. Firstly, once whites had conceded loss of both the birth
race and the state, sacrificing female bodies on the altars of
nationalism lost most of its caison d'etre. Secondly, once the
incubus of white supremacy was removed, a sizeable black
constituency publicly supporting pro-choice positions promptly
emerged.
Nonetheless, the past lives on. Deeply entrenched patriarchy
remains; black feminists have claimed that gender discrimination
was and is worse than that based on racial, class or any other
grounds.151 Following in the footsteps of ARAG, a pro-choice
black elite is countering pervasive hostility to the 'Hterated
woman' by focusing on minimizing backstreet abortions. Yet to
argue for legal reform on the grounds of health is to play
straight into the strongest suit of the medical profession. This
is not a social group with a long history of taking either
democracy or the health needs of the majority of the population
seriously. (Tellingly, although support for abortion on request
in the Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists had risen to
41% in 1990, its council was only willing to support changes to
which 75% of its members agreed.")
To play the game by the rules of misogynist men, the past
suggests, is to lose. To detach the struggle for reproductive
rights from women's needs and an organized feminist movement is
to mortgage the future. Firstly, it makes substantial legal
change less likely. With 'the exception of state socialist
societies, in every case where [liberal] reform or repeal of
abortion laws occurred, this did not occur without bitter
struggles carried out by feminists'.15J Secondly, this tactic
cedes control to powerful patriarchs - be they doctors,
population controllers, ministers or Parliamentarians - all of
whom have gendered and professional interests in female bodies.
Thirdly, winning the right to a legal abortion does not alter the
material conditions under which women make appallingly painful
choices. Or as a white student who had terminated her pregnancy
insisted, legalization was not enough.
You must also look at birth control, and the fact that the
pharmaceutical industry is fucking women around, basically.
They're making us pay for ridiculous unsafe drugs, when we
know that they could be doing so much better...And we need
to look at support for mothers, so that having a child
doesn't mean we have to depend on some arsehole man.154
Yet patriarchs are not the only obstacle. All the
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circumstances that fostered absolute opposition to abortion in
the past - marginalization, fundamentalist Christianity, links to
American 'pro-lifers' - have become far more pronounced in the
wake of economic crisis, the emergence of a substantial African
middle class, and reincorporation into the world economy. Now
that the debate is focused on blacks, there is an infinitely
larger reservoir of anti-feminist and anti-elitist sentiments
waiting to be tapped. As an woman who had encountered the
prevalence of abortions among black students noted, it exists not
least among African females, who 'don't want their daughters
following in the "bad footsteps" of educated women.'155
What constitutes democratic politics in a society where
inequalities are so stark? Is it simply a right to a tiny say in
which male-dominated party misrepresents the populace? Will ten
white men in a Select Committee then be replaced by eleven
'learneth evil cloaks' in a constitutional court, overriding the
opposition of the majority of the population to abortion on
demand? Should countless warnings that democratization requires
some racial equalization be applied in class and gender domains
as well? For Cheryl Carolus of the ANC, men and women could only
have the same say in decisions about abortion 'when we actually
level the playing ground in terms of the relationships between
men and women.'15* Are not the playing fields of class at least
as central if democratic ideals are not to be travestied?
But the questions are academic. As the passage of the
Abortion and Sterilization Act of 1975 aptly demonstrated, the
meaning of democracy is determined in struggle, which is usually
won by the more powerful man. Nonetheless, women have already had
the last word on many malestream versions of this elastic
concept. Abortion on demand already exists in South Africa. It
has for many decades. The choice between withholding or granting
what some call a democratic right is not open to us. Our choices
range instead between turning a blind eye to crude surgery that
can kill women as well as foetuses, or struggling to transform
profoundly undemocratic conditions transmitted from the past,
that harshly constrain women's reproductive choices in both the
present and the future.
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